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a b s t r a c t 
To provide micro-founded real wage rigidities, the literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle has consid- 
ered alternating offers on one side, and asymmetric information on the other. Separately, however, these two 
frameworks deliver a limited amount of wage stickiness and thus require questionable calibrations to raise un- 
employment fluctuations. In this paper, we argue that the alternating offers model with one-sided asymmetric 
information, which combines the two frameworks, gives a more satisfactory answer to the puzzle. The results 
are improved along two dimensions. First, we show that this model is capable to generate large unemployment 
movements for a realistic calibration. Secondly, the model produces a right degree of real wage pro-cyclicality 
for such a calibration and therefore delivers a micro-founded explanation to real wage rigidities. 
























































The incapacity of the canonical search-and-matching model to repli-
ate labor market dynamics has triggered a substantial literature.
mong the myriad of solutions proposed to solve this “unemployment
olatility puzzle ” raised by Shimer (2005) , real wage rigidities have re-
eived the most attention. In order to give micro-foundations to real
age stickiness, the literature related to this puzzle has investigated
ainly two ways: alternating wage offers ( Hall and Milgrom, 2008 ) and
symmetric information during the wage bargaining ( Kennan, 2010 ).
hese two frameworks, however, display only a weak amount of wage
tickiness and therefore need questionable calibrations to amplify un-
mployment fluctuations. Particularly, very high labor shares and large
dditional hiring costs are required to reproduce the volatility of the un-
mployment rate in the United States. In this paper, we argue that the
lternating offers model with one-sided asymmetric information, which
ombines the two frameworks, provides a more satisfactory answer to
he puzzle pointed out by Shimer. Notably, the higher degree of wage
tickiness makes this model able to produce large unemployment move-
ents for realistic labor shares and without assuming additional costs
or firms. 
The alternating offers model with one-sided asymmetric informa-
ion (henceforth “AOMOSAI ”) initially considers a seller of an item and
 potential buyer who bargain over the item ’s price. Both parties al-
ernate in making proposals in a Rubinstein (1982) fashion. Moreover,E-mail addresses: pierrick.clerc@banque-france.fr , pierrick.clerc@live.fr 
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927-5371/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. nformation is asymmetric since the seller ’s valuation is common knowl-
dge whereas the buyer ’s valuation is known only to herself. In such a
ramework, there is a multiplicity of equilibria which explains that a lit-
rature was addressed to narrow down the range of predicted bargaining
utcomes. Grossman and Perry (1986) and Gul et al. (1986) develop re-
pectively the concepts of stationary equilibrium and perfect sequential
quilibrium. Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) refine the conditions over
trategies and time interval between successive offers that ensure a sin-
le equilibrium. 
The wage bargaining is a natural implementation of that frame-
ork. In this case, the worker and the employer alternate in making
age proposals but the productivity of the match is observed only by
he employer. Within this set-up, Menzio (2007) determines the con-
itions under which vague non-contractual statements (found in help
anted ads) by the firms are correlated to actual wages and partially
irect the search strategy of the workers. However, the AOMOSAI was
ot considered by the large literature that follows the seminal paper by
himer (2005) on the unemployment volatility puzzle. Instead, this lit-
rature focuses on each component separately, i.e. alternating offers on
ne hand, and asymmetric information on the other. 
In the canonical search-and-matching model, the real wage is deter-
ined by the standard Nash Bargaining for which information is perfect
nd the threat points of the parties are their pro-cyclical outside options.
he resulting real wage is thus flexible with respect to both labor pro-
uctivity and labor-market conditions. Hall and Milgrom (2008) replacegot, Guido Menzio, Franck Portier and Etienne Wasmer for helpful comments. The views 









































































































he Nash Bargaining by the Alternating Offers Bargaining. They point
ut that on a frictional labor market, the pro-cyclical outside options
re not credible threat points. The credible threat points in a sequen-
ial bargaining are the a-cyclical payments obtained during the bargain-
ng, which implies some rigidity of the real wage with respect to labor-
arket conditions. The Asymmetric Information Game was investigated
y Kennan (2010) . Firms would be subject to both aggregate and spe-
ific productivity shocks and the latter are supposed to be pro-cyclical. It
s also assumed that only employers are able to observe the specific pro-
uctivity component. Kennan shows, in a generalization of the Nash Bar-
aining to cases with private information, that it is rational for workers
o be prudent by considering that the specific productivity is the lowest.
he bargained real wage is therefore insensitive to the larger number
f matches realizing a high specific productivity in cyclical booms, and
hen delivers some rigidity with respect to labor productivity. 
In this paper, we stress that the Alternating Offers Bargaining and
he Asymmetric Information Game, separately, display only a limited
eal wage stickiness. These frameworks thus require implausible calibra-
ion values, most notably labor shares much higher than their empirical
ounterpart and large additional hiring and training costs, to amplify
abor-market fluctuations. We show that once these models are cali-
rated to match the empirical labor share in the US, and without ad-
itional costs, the volatility of the labor market collapses. By combining
he two frameworks, the AOMOSAI brings a higher level of wage sticki-
ess that considerably magnifies the labor-market response to aggregate
hocks. The results are improved along two dimensions. First, the model
lmost completely replicates unemployment volatility when calibrated
o match the empirical labor share, and without assuming additional
osts. Secondly, the model produces a right amount of pro-cyclicality for
he real wage with this calibration and then provides a micro-founded
xplanation of the real wage rigidities which characterize labor markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
erive the equations of the model. In Section 3 , we calibrate and assess
ts quantitative properties. Section 4 concludes. 
. The alternating offers model with one-sided asymmetric 
nformation 
.1. The basic structure 
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of workers and a
ontinuum of firms with measures 1. Every agent is risk-neutral and has
 life of indefinite length. The current state is denoted by i . A job match
f type j produces an output at flow rate 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 , where p i is an aggregate
omponent common to all matches, and y j is a random idiosyncratic
ariable drawn from a commonly known state varying CDF F i ( y ) that
as strictly positive density f i ( y ) over the fixed interval [ y L , y H ], with
 L > 0 and ∫ 𝑦 𝐻 𝑦 𝐿 𝑓 𝑖 ( 𝑦 ) 𝑑𝑦 = 1 . 
We assume that there is a positive covariance between p i and the
verage (or expected) idiosyncratic productivity ∫ 𝑦 𝐻 
𝑦 𝐿 
𝑦𝑓 𝑖 ( 𝑦 ) 𝑑𝑦, which is
n important feature of Kennan (2010) . This positive covariance means
hat the average idiosyncratic productivity is pro-cyclical: during an eco-
omic expansion, there is an improvement in the distribution of the id-
osyncratic productivity and the amount of matches with higher types
ncreases. Kennan (2010) gives some evidence 2 that supports this as-
umption. 
The average value of total productivity (henceforth the “average pro-
uctivity ”) in this economy at state i is given by: 
𝑖 = 𝑝 𝑖 + ∫
𝑦 𝐻 
𝑦 𝐿 
𝑦𝑓 𝑖 ( 𝑦 ) 𝑑𝑦 (1)
Following a positive shock on aggregate productivity, 𝜌i rises both
ecause p i and the proportion of matches with higher types increase.
ote that 𝜌i is the productivity that we observe in the empirical data. 2 From Dunne et al. (2004) . 𝜔
88 The rest of the framework is analogous to the standard search and
atching model. The opportunity cost of employment to the worker and
he cost of posting a vacancy to a firm are denoted by z and c , respec-
ively. The number of new matches each period is given by a matching
unction m ( u i , v i ), where u i and v i represent the number of unemployed
orkers and the number of open job vacancies, respectively. Since the
umber of workers is normalized to 1, u i and v i also represent the un-
mployment and vacancy rates. The job-finding rate 𝑓 ( 𝜃𝑖 ) = 
𝑚 ( 𝑢 𝑖 ,𝑣 𝑖 ) 
𝑢 𝑖 
=
 (1 , 𝜃𝑖 ) is increasing in market tightness 𝜃i , the ratio of vacancies to
nemployment. The rate at which vacancies are filled is denoted by
( 𝜃𝑖 ) = 
𝑚 ( 𝑢 𝑖 ,𝑣 𝑖 ) 
𝑣 𝑖 
= 𝑓 ( 𝜃𝑖 ) 
𝜃𝑖 
, and is decreasing in 𝜃i . The form of the match-







his implies 𝑓 ( 𝜃𝑖 ) = 𝑚 0 𝜃𝑖 1− 𝜂 and 𝑞( 𝜃𝑖 ) = 𝑚 0 𝜃𝑖 − 𝜂 . Finally, matches are de-
troyed at the exogenous rate s and all agents have the same discount
ate r . 
We denote by U i the value of unemployment, W ij the worker ’s value
f a match of type j, J ij and V ij the employer ’s values of a filled job and
 vacancy of type j , respectively. All these values are determined by the
ellman equations: 
𝑈 𝑖 = 𝑧 + 𝑓 ( 𝜃𝑖 )( 𝑊 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑈 𝑖 ) + 𝜆( 𝐸 𝑖 𝑈 𝑖 ′ − 𝑈 𝑖 ) (2)
𝑊 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑤 𝑖 ( 𝑦 𝑗 ) − 𝑠 ( 𝑊 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑈 𝑖 ) + 𝜆( 𝐸 𝑖 𝑊 𝑖 ′𝑗 − 𝑊 𝑖𝑗 ) (3)
𝐽 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 − 𝑤 𝑖 ( 𝑦 𝑗 ) − 𝑠𝐽 𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆( 𝐸 𝑖 𝐽 𝑖 ′𝑗 − 𝐽 𝑖𝑗 ) (4)
𝑉 𝑖𝑗 = − 𝑐 + 𝑞( 𝜃𝑖 )( 𝐽 𝑖𝑗 − 𝑉 𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝜆( 𝐸 𝑖 𝑉 𝑖 ′𝑗 − 𝑉 𝑖𝑗 ) (5)
here 𝜆 represents the arrival rate of aggregate productivity shocks and
 i the expectation operator conditional on the current state i . 
Free entry is assumed on the goods market, such that the expected
rofit of opening a vacancy is zero ( 𝑉 𝑖𝑗 = 0 ). For a type j match, the
ero-profit condition is: 
𝑐 
𝑞( 𝜃𝑖 ) 
= 
𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 − 𝑤 𝑖 ( 𝑦 𝑗 ) + 𝜆𝐸 𝑖 𝐽 𝑖 ′𝑗 
𝑟 + 𝑠 + 𝜆
For the whole economy, this condition is: 
𝑐 
𝑞( 𝜃𝑖 ) 
= 
𝜌𝑖 − 𝜔 𝑖 + 𝜆𝐸 𝑖 𝐽 𝑖 ′
𝑟 + 𝑠 + 𝜆
(6)
ith 𝜔 i the average wage (the wage observed in the data) given by: 
 𝑖 = ∫
𝑦 𝐻 
𝑦 𝐿 
𝑤 𝑖 ( 𝑦 ) 𝑓 𝑖 ( 𝑦 ) 𝑑𝑦 (7)
Wages are assumed to be renegotiated after every aggregate shock,
o the real wages determined in the next subsection only depend on the
urrent state i . 
.2. The wage bargaining 
ash Bargaining. Before Shimer (2005) , the Nash Bargaining was tra-
itionally applied by the search-and-matching literature to get the real
age. In this case, the equilibrium wage is determined by the General-
zed Nash Solution with the outside options as threat points. The outside
ptions are U i for the worker and 𝑉 𝑖𝑗 = 0 for the employer. The surplus
in flow rates) of the worker for a type j match is therefore 𝑤 𝑖 ( 𝑦 𝑗 ) − 𝑟𝑈 𝑖 
hile the surplus of the employer for the same match is 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 − 𝑤 𝑖𝑗 .





( 𝑦 𝑗 ) = (1 − 𝛽) 𝑧 + 𝛽( 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 + 𝑐𝜃𝑖 ) 




= (1 − 𝛽) 𝑧 + 𝛽( 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑐𝜃𝑖 ) (8) 









































































































symmetric Information Game. In the Asymmetric Information Game
onsidered by Kennan (2010) , it is assumed that only employers are able
o observe the type of each match. Workers know the distribution of y
ver [ y L , y H ], but they are unable to observe the types of the matches.
ennan applies the Myerson (1984) neutral bargaining solution, which
s a generalization of the Nash Bargaining to the case of imperfect in-
ormation. He shows that it is rational for workers to bargain under the
ssumption that the match ’s type is the lowest. With such a strategy,
 given worker avoids to lose the match, which would be the outcome
f the match ’s type was lower than the type considered by the worker.
hatever the type of the match, the equilibrium wage is then the real
age resulting the Nash Bargaining over the lowest surplus, 𝑤 𝑁𝐵 
𝑖 
( 𝑦 𝐿 ) .




= 𝑤 𝑁𝐵 
𝑖 
( 𝑦 𝐿 ) = (1 − 𝛽) 𝑧 + 𝛽( 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝐿 + 𝑐𝜃𝑖 ) (9)
There is only one difference between Eqs. (8) and (9) : in Eq. (8) , it
s the average productivity ( 𝜌i ) which drives 𝜔 
𝑁𝐵 
𝑖 
, while in Eq. (9) , it is
nstead the productivity of the lowest type ( 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝐿 ) which drives 𝜔 𝐴𝐼𝐺 𝑖 .
ecall that a positive covariance between the aggregate productivity and
he average idiosyncratic productivity is assumed. When the aggregate
roductivity increases, 𝜌i rises because both p i and the proportion of
atches with higher types increase. Rather, 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝐿 rises only through
he increase in p i . The productivity which drives 𝜔 
𝐴𝐼𝐺 
𝑖 
is thus less pro-
yclical than the productivity which drives 𝜔 𝑁𝐵 
𝑖 
. Hence, the average wage
esulting from the Asymmetric Information Game is less pro-cyclical than the
ne resulting from the Nash Bargaining . 
lternating Offers Bargaining. In the sequential wage bargaining consid-
red by Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore et al. (1986) , information over
he type of each match is perfect. Workers and employers are assumed to
ake offers alternately until they reach an agreement. After a proposer
akes an offer, the responding party has three options: 
(i) accept the current proposal; 
(ii) reject this proposal and make a counter-offer next period. During
the period, the worker receives z while it is assumed that the
employer incurs a fixed cost 𝛾. The payoffs z and − 𝛾 are called
the disagreement payoffs ; 
(iii) abandon the negotiation and take her outside option, i.e. U i for
the worker and 𝑉 𝑖𝑗 = 0 for the employer. 
Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue that on a frictional labor market
with f ( 𝜃i ) < 1), both the worker and the employer gain more by go-
ng to the end of the bargaining process rather than leaving it to take
he outside options. The threat to leave the wage bargaining is then not
redible. The only credible threat is to delay it. 
In order to determine the equilibrium wage, we apply the main re-
ult of Binmore et al. (1986) : whenever the time interval between suc-
essive offers is sufficiently small, the solution of the Alternating Offers
argaining converges to the solution of the corresponding static game. 3 
he solution to this game is found by the Generalized Nash Solution
ith the credible threat points. The credible threat points are not the
utside options but the payments the players obtain when the bargain
s delayed, i.e. the disagreement payoffs z and − 𝛾. The surplus (in flow
ates) of the worker for a type j match is therefore 𝑤 𝑖 ( 𝑦 𝑗 ) − 𝑧 while the
urplus of the employer for the same match is 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 − 𝑤 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾. Hence,





( 𝑦 𝑗 ) = (1 − 𝛽) 𝑧 + 𝛽( 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝑗 + 𝛾) 
The average wage is: 
 
𝐴𝑂𝐵 = (1 − 𝛽) 𝑧 + 𝛽( 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛾) (10)𝑖 
3 Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) , Jung and Kuester (2011) and Faia et al. (2014) follow 
he same strategy to determine the real wage. 
89 Again, there is only one difference between Eqs. (8) and (10) : in
q. (8) , 𝜔 𝑁𝐵 
𝑖 
depends on labor-market conditions through 𝜃i , whereas in
q. (10) , 𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝐵 
𝑖 
is insulated from these conditions but instead depends on
he fixed cost 𝛾. This reflects the fact that the threat points for the Alter-
ating Offers Bargaining are no longer the pro-cyclical outside options
ut instead the a-cyclical disagreement payoffs. Therefore, the average
age resulting from the Alternating Offers Bargaining is also less pro-cyclical
han the one resulting from the Nash Bargaining . 
OMOSAI. The AOMOSAI involves the introduction of asymmetric in-
ormation into the Alternating Offers Bargaining. As in the Asymmetric
nformation Game, it is assumed that employers can observe the type of
ach match while workers only know the distribution of y over [ y L , y H ].
n an online appendix, 4 we use the demonstration of Menzio (2007) to
nd the solution of this wage bargain. We show that the equilibrium
eal wage, whatever the type of the match, is the wage outcome of the
lternating Offers Bargaining (i.e. with perfect information) between a
orker and an employer with the lowest match ’s type, 𝑤 𝐴𝑂𝐵 
𝑖 
( 𝑦 𝐿 ) . The
verage wage for the AOMOSAI is thus: 
 
𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
𝑖 
= 𝑤 𝐴𝑂𝐵 
𝑖 
( 𝑦 𝐿 ) = (1 − 𝛽) 𝑧 + 𝛽( 𝑝 𝑖 + 𝑦 𝐿 + 𝛾) (11)
Since the AOMOSAI combines the Alternating Offers Bargaining and
he Asymmetric Information Game, the average wage resulting from this
odel is less pro-cyclical than the ones resulting from its two components
aken in isolation . We have 𝜔 𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
𝑖 




𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
𝑖 
is not affected by the increasing number of matches which
ealize higher idiosyncratic productivity levels when the aggregate
roductivity increases. At the same time, we have 𝜔 𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
𝑖 
less pro-
yclical than 𝜔 𝐴𝐼𝐺 
𝑖 
, since the threat points are not the pro-cyclical out-
ide options but instead the a-cyclical disagreement payoffs. 
. Quantitative analysis 
In this section, we compare the quantitative implications of the
our previously described wage specifications. We follow Hall and Mil-
rom (2008) and Kennan (2010) by evaluating the labor market volatil-
ty implied by these specifications from a comparative static exercise
hat compares steady states at different realizations of p i . We assume
wo states, 1 and 2, with 𝑝 2 = 1 . 01 𝑝 1 and compute the elasticity of the
arket tightness with respect to the average productivity. 5 This elastic-
ty is obtained by setting 𝜆 = 0 in Eq. (6) and by dividing the log change
n 𝜃 by the log change in 𝜌. We get: 
𝜃 = 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜃) 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜌) 
= 1 
𝜂
𝜌 − 𝜖𝜔 𝜔 
𝜌 − 𝜔 
(12) 
here 𝜖𝜔 is the elasticity of the average wage with respect to the average
roductivity, obtained by dividing the log change in 𝜔 by the log change
n 𝜌. As argued by Shimer (2005) and Pissarides (2009) , this approach
s a proper approximation of stochastic simulations if the productivity
rocess is sufficiently persistent, which is the case in Shimer ’s data. 
The wage elasticities for the Nash Bargaining, the Asymmetric Infor-
ation Game, the Alternating Offers Bargaining and the AOMOSAI are
espectively given by: 
𝜔 𝑁𝐵 = 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜔 𝑁𝐵 ) 









𝜔 𝐴𝐼𝐺 = 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜔 𝐴𝐼𝐺 ) 











𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝐵 = 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝐵 ) 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜌) 
= 𝛽𝜌
𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝐵 
(15) 4 Available upon request to the author. 
5 The indicator that received most attention in the literature. 


























































Parameter and steady-state values. 
Parameters Values Target/Mean values/Data 
𝜌1 1 Normalization at one 
y L 0.1 Represents 10% of 𝜌1 
p 1 0.9 No rent in state 1, Kennan (2010) 
𝛿𝑝 
𝛿𝜌
0.5 Midpoint between Kennan (2010) and Atalay (2017) 
𝜂 0.4 Blanchard and Diamond (1989) 
𝜃1 0.72 Pissarides (2009) 
𝛽 0.5 Symmetric game 
z 0.21 Replacement rate at 30% 
c 0.26 Labor share at 70% for NB and AIG 
𝛾 0.19 Labor share at 70% for AOB and AOMOSAI 
Table 2 
Tightness and wage elasticities. 
Tightness elasticity Wage elasticity 
𝜖𝜃 𝜖𝜔 
Empirical 7.56 0.45 
AOMOSAI 6.25 0.36 
Alternating Offers Bargaining 4.17 0.71 
Asymmetric Information Game 3.49 0.83 










































𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐼 = 
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ( 𝜔 𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 ) 










represents the relative contribution of aggregate shocks to the
uctuations of the average productivity. This ratio only matters for 𝜖𝜔 𝐴𝐼𝐺 
nd for 𝜖𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐼 . 
.1. Calibration 
To compute the various tightness and wage elasticities, we need to
et values for the following parameters and steady-state variables: 𝜌1 ,
 L , p 1 , 
𝛿𝑝 
𝛿𝜌
, 𝜂, 𝜃1 , 𝛽, z, c and 𝛾. 
roductivity. We normalize 𝜌1 at one and follow Kennan (2010) by as-
uming that in state 1, all matches realize y L . This implies 𝜌1 = 𝑝 1 + 𝑦 𝐿 =
 . For the sake of simplicity, we set y L to be 10% of the average pro-
uctivity in state 1, which results in 𝑝 1 = 0 . 9 and 𝑦 𝐿 = 0 . 1 . Note that the
ssumption that all matches realize y L and the values retained for p 1 and
 L have no impact on the quantitative results. In the data, we observe
i and its fluctuations. However, we are not able to distinguish what
roportions of these fluctuations are attributable to aggregate shocks
nd to idiosyncratic shocks since, as Kennan (2010) argues, the latters
re privately observed. From the evidence in Dunne et al. (2004) and
ennan (2010) stresses that specific shocks would be moderately pro-
yclical, which would imply a value for 
𝑑𝑝 
𝑑𝜌
relatively high. At the same
ime, Atalay (2017) finds that idiosyncratic shocks seem much more




tively low. We then set 
𝑑𝑝 
𝑑𝜌
to 0.5, at the midpoint between these two
esults. 
abor market and wage bargaining. The elasticity of the matching
unction with respect to unemployment, 𝜂, is selected at 0.4 from
lanchard and Diamond (1989) . The labor market tightness at state 1,
1 , is set to 0.72 from the evidence in Pissarides (2009) . Following a
ommon practice, the worker ’s bargaining power 𝛽 is chosen at 0.5,
hich implies a symmetric bargaining game. We restrict the flow value
f unemployment z to unemployment benefits. From Anderson and
eyer (1997) and Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) , the after-tax replace-
ent rate is around 30% in the US, so we set 𝑧 = 0 . 3 𝜔 1 . Two param-
ters remain to calibrate: the vacancy posting cost, c , and the fixed
ost incurred by employers during the wage bargaining, 𝛾. Lacking con-
entional values for these costs, we proceed as follows. We first note
hat 𝜔 𝑁𝐵 
𝑖 
and 𝜔 𝐴𝐼𝐺 
𝑖 




and 𝜔 𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
𝑖 
depend on 𝛾 but are independent from c . More-
ver, since our calibration for productivity implies 𝜌1 = 𝑝 1 + 𝑦 𝐿 , we
ave 𝜔 𝑁𝐵 1 = 𝜔 
𝐴𝐼𝐺 
1 = 𝜔 
𝐴𝑂𝐵 
1 = 𝜔 
𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
1 only if 𝛾 = 𝑐𝜃1 . We calibrate c
o as to obtain a labor share at the standard value of 70% for the
ash Bargaining and the Asymmetric Information Game in state 1, i.e.
 
𝑁𝐵 
1 = 𝜔 
𝐴𝐼𝐺 
1 = 0 . 7 . We find 𝑐 = 0 . 26 . We then set 𝛾 = 𝑐𝜃1 = 0 . 19 , which
nsures a labor share at 70% for the Alternating Offers Bargaining and
he AOMOSAI in state 1, i.e. 𝜔 𝐴𝑂𝐵 1 = 𝜔 
𝐴𝑂 𝑀𝑂 𝑆𝐴𝐼 
1 = 0 . 7 ( Table 1 ). 
.2. Results and assessment 
The empirical tightness elasticity (7.56) is found by Mortensen and
agypál (2007) and Pissarides (2009) , while the empirical wage elas-
icity (0.45) comes from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . All of these
ata relate to the US economy ( Table 2 ). 
The AOMOSAI improves the results on two grounds. First, it consid-
rably amplifies the dynamics of the labor market. Under our calibra-
ion, the model replicates 83% of the observed tightness elasticity. This
s 50% and 79% greater than what is produced by the Alternating Offers
argaining and by the Asymmetric Information Game, respectively. This
esult is related to the higher amount of real wage stickiness generated90 y the AOMOSAI. Secondly, this model displays a wage elasticity very
lose to the one found by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . It is thus
ble to replicate the observed rigidity of the real wage and provides an
xplanation of that rigidity. 
Separately, the Alternating Offers Bargaining and the Asymmetric
nformation Game generate a limited wage stickiness. Hagedorn and
anovskii (2008) demonstrate that what matters for labor-market vari-
bility is the response of the profit in percentage terms . To get a respon-
ive profit in proportion, the real wage has to be high and sticky. Given
hat our calibration targets the US labor share, the resulting equilibrium
age is low. The limited wage rigidity displayed by the Alternating Of-
ers Bargaining and the Asymmetric Information Game therefore neces-
arily generates a weak tightness elasticity. This explains why Hall and
ilgrom (2008) and Kennan (2010) retain high values for the disagree-
ent payoffs. Both papers notably set z at 0.7. Moreover, Hall and Mil-
rom calibrate 𝛾 at 0.27. The labor shares which stem from these payoffs
re close to 100%. Alternatively, additional fixed costs for hiring and
raining are often assumed to amplify firms ’ profit responses in propor-
ion. For instance, Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) introduce fixed hiring
osts H in the Alternating Offers Bargaining. They show that the result-
ng framework is able to replicate the tightness elasticity for 𝑧 = 0 . 7 and
 = 0 . 22 . Although lower than in Hall and Milgrom (2008) , their labor
hare is still high (85%) while Kennan (2010) argues that “the empiri-
al plausibility of the required value for H (about nine months ’ worth of
rofits) is questionable ”. Instead, the AOMOSAI generates a large labor-
arket volatility for the empirical labor share and does not need any
dditional cost. 
There is still a debate concerning the cyclical behavior of real wages.
n one side, Pissarides (2009) reviews a body of studies based on in-
ividual data which tend to show that there would be no real wage
tickiness. The wage elasticity for new matches, which is the rele-
ant one for job creations, would be equal to 1. On the other side,
agedorn and Manovskii (2008) find an elasticity for new matches of
.45 from both aggregate and individual data. Gertler et al. (2008) show
conometrically that the finding of Pissarides (2009) and others is due
o a “cyclical composition effect ” that biases the results towards more
age flexibility. The wage elasticity estimated for new matches by them
nd by Gertler and Trigari (2009) is around 0.5. Haefke et al. (2013) es-
imate a wage elasticity for new matches at 0.83, but with a stan-
ard error of 0.51 that embeds both the value found by Hagedorn and
anovskii (2008) and the one displayed by the AOMOSAI. 








































S  . Conclusion 
The Alternating Offers Bargaining and the Asymmetric Information
ame provide the main solutions to the unemployment volatility puz-
le resting on real wage rigidities. In this paper, we have pointed out
hat the alternating offers model with one-sided asymmetric informa-
ion ( Grossman and Perry, 1986; Gul and Sonnenschein, 1988; Menzio,
007 ), which combines the two frameworks, gives a more satisfactory
nswer to the puzzle. Separately, each bargaining brings a limited wage
tickiness and thus requires very high labor shares and additional hir-
ng costs. The AOMOSAI produces more wage rigidity, which ampli-
es unemployment responses to aggregate shocks. This model almost
ompletely solves the puzzle for an equilibrium wage that respects the
mpirical labor share, and without having to assume additional costs.
oreover, the AOMOSAI is capable to display a right amount of wage
igidity and therefore gives a completely micro-founded explanation to
he real wage stickiness characterizing labor markets. 
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